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Abstract
We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a public facility
among agents who have different needs for it. We base two charac-
terizations of the sequential equal contributions rule on smallest-cost
consistency. Namely, (i) the rule is the only rule satisfying equal
treatment of equals, independence of all but the smallest-cost, and
smallest-cost consistency, and (ii) it is the only rule satisfying equal
share lower bound, cost monotonicity, and smallest-cost consistency.
Journal of Economics Literature Classification Numbers: C71; D30;
D63.
Keywords: consistency; sequential equal contributions rule; airport
problems; TU games; the Shapley value.
1 Introduction
We consider a class of cost sharing problems with the following features:
agents are ordered in terms of their needs for a public facility, and satisfying
a given agent implies satisfying all agents with smaller needs than his. An
example is the so-called “airport problem”: different airlines need airstrips
of different lengths. The larger a plane, the longer the airstrip it needs.
Serving a given plane implies serving all smaller planes. To accommodate all
planes, the airstrip must be long enough for the largest plane. How should
the cost of the airstrip be shared among the airlines?1 A “rule” is a function
that associates with each airport problem, an allocation of the cost of the
airstrip, called a “contribution vector”. A number of properties of rules
have been formulated for this problem and are motivated by various fairness
principles. The literature devoted to the search for rules satisfying these
properties, singly and in various combinations, is initiated by Littlechild and
Owen (1973).2
1Another application is the so-called “irrigation problems”: ranchers are distributed
along an irrigation ditch. A rancher only needs the part of the ditch from his field to the
headgate. To accommodate all ranchers, the ditch should reach the furthest field from the
headgate. How should the cost of maintaining the ditch be shared among the ranchers?
2For a comprehensive survey of this literature, see Thomson (2005).
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A well-known rule is the “sequential equal contributions” (SEC) rule,
which has been employed in real world for many years.3 To introduce the
rule, suppose that there are n airlines indexed by 1, . . . , n. Let li be the length
of airstrip that airline i needs, and ci the cost parameter of airline i (the cost
of building such airstrip that airline i needs). For simplicity, assume that
l1 < · · · < ln, and that the cost parameter is a strictly increasing function of
airstrip length. Thus, c1 < · · · < cn. Imagine that the airstrip is composed
of “segments”: the first segment is defined by l1, the second segment l2 − l1,
the third segment l3− l2, and so on. In addition, the cost of the first segment
is c1, the cost of the second segment c2 − c1, the cost of the third segment
c3 − c2, and so on. All airlines using a given segment contribute equally to
the cost of the segment, and thus pay the total of the contributions of each
segment that they use. (Note that Littlechild and Owen (1973) show that
the contributions vector recommended by the SEC rule coincides with that
prescribed by the “Shapley value” (Shapley, 1953) applied to the TU game
associated to the problem in a natural way.4)
Our purpose here is to base axiomatic characterizations of the SEC rule on
the following variable-population property, which is an application for airport
problems of a general principle of “consistency”5.6 Consider a contributions
vector x chosen by a rule for the problem just defined. Imagine that airline 1
3The terminology we adopt is borrowed from Thomson (2005). This rule has been
discussed by Baker and Associates (1965) and Littlechild and Owen (1973). It underlies
the “serial” idea that has been the subject of a number of studies by many authors. For
instance, Moulin and Shenker (1992). Aadland and Kolpin (1998) refer to it as the serial
cost-share rule, and explain that it is standard in allocating the cost of irrigation ditch in
south-central Montana.
4Given an airport problem, we first transform the problem into a TU game, which we
call the associated airport game, by defining the worth of each coalition as the cost of
building the airstrip used by an airline with the largest cost parameter in that coalition.
We then apply a TU game solution to solve the game. This yields a payoff vector. Finally,
we take this payoff vector as the contributions vector for the airport problem.
5For a survey of the literature on consistency and its converse, see Thomson (2000).
6A number of authors have provided several axiomatic characterizations of the SEC
rule. Readers are referred to Dubey (1982), Moulin and Shenker (1992), Aadland and
Kolpin (1998), and Potters and Sudho¨lter (1999).
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pays his contribution x1 and “leaves”, and reassess the situation from the
viewpoint of the remaining airlines. It is of course natural to think of x1 as a
contribution to the part of the airstrip that airline 1 uses. Since contributing
to the part of the airstrip that airline 1 uses implies contributing to the part
of the airstrip that all other airlines use, the cost parameters of the remaining
airlines are then revised down by the amount x1. “Smallest-cost consistency”
of the rule requires that for the reduced problem just defined, each of the
remaining airlines should contribute the same amount as he did initially.7
In addition to smallest-cost consistency, we consider the following desir-
able properties. The first property is a symmetry property, “equal treatment
of equals”: two airlines with the same cost parameters should contribute
equal amounts. The second property is an independence property, “indepen-
dence of all but the smallest-cost”: if the cost parameters of all airlines other
than an airline with the smallest cost parameter increase by the same posi-
tive amount, the airline with the smallest cost parameter should contribute
the same amount as he did initially. The third one is a lower bound require-
ment on each airline’s contribution. Imagine, for each airline separately, that
his cost parameter is the smallest. We then divide his cost parameter by
the numbers of airlines. (Note that any segment the airline uses is jointly
used by all other airline. Thus, an equal share of the cost parameter of the
airline is very natural.) “Equal share lower bound” of the rule requires that
each airline should contribute at least as much as an equal share of his cost
parameter. The last one is a monotonicity property, “cost monotonicity”: if
an airline’s cost parameter increases, all other airlines should contribute at
most as much as they did initially.
7When another airline leaves, it is not easy to define the reduced problem. Potters and
Sudho¨lter (1999) propose two types of consistency requirements for airport problems, “ν-
consistency” and “ψ-consistency”. Depending on which formation of a reduced problem
is adopted, we are led to different consistency properties. However, when we focus on the
departure of an airline with the smallest cost parameter, ν-consistency and ψ-consistency
coincide with smallest-cost consistency. Compared to ν-consistency and ψ-consistency,
smallest-cost consistency is natural and no controversial at all.
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Our contribution is that we offer two consistency characterizations of the
SEC rule. Namely, (i) the rule is the only rule satisfying equal treatment
of equals, independence of all but the smallest-cost, and smallest-cost con-
sistency, and (ii) it is the only rule satisfying equal share lower bound, cost
monotonicity, and smallest-cost consistency.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model,
the nucleolus, and the properties. Section 3 present the main result and show
the independence of the properties.
2 Notation and definitions
There is a universe of “potential” agents, denoted by I j N where N is the
set of natural numbers. Let N be the class of non-empty and finite subsets
of I. Given N ∈ N and i ∈ N , let ci ∈ R+ be agent i’s cost parameter,
and c ≡ (ci)i∈N the profile of cost parameters. An airport problem for N ,
or simply a problem for N , is a list c ∈ RN+ . Let CN be the class of all
problems for N . A contributions vector for c ∈ CN is a vector x ∈ RN
such that it is “efficient”, i.e.,
∑
i∈N xi = maxi∈N ci and “reasonable”, i.e., for
each i ∈ N , 0 ≤ xi ≤ ci. Let X (c) be the set of all contributions vectors for
c ∈ CN . A rule is a function defined on ⋃N∈N CN that associates with each
N ∈ N and each c ∈ CN a vector in X (c). Let n denote the number of agents
in N and η : {1, . . . , n} → N be a bijection such that cη(1) ≤ · · · ≤ cη(n).
Thus, the agents in N are ordered in terms of their cost parameters. Note
that if several agents have the same cost parameters, then the order is not
unique. For convention, we assume that N ≡ {1, . . . , n} and c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cn.
Our generic notation for rules is S. For each coalition N ′ ⊂ N , we denote
(ci)i∈N ′ by cN ′ , (Si (c))i∈N ′ by SN ′ (c), and so on. All terminologies we adopt
are borrowed from Thomson (2005)
We now formally introduce the sequential equal contributions rule.
Sequential equal contributions rule, SEC: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈
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CN , and each i ∈ N ,
SECi(c) ≡ c1
n
+
c2 − c1
n− 1 + · · ·+
ci − ci−1
n− i+ 1 .
The SEC rule satisfies the following properties informally defined in the
introduction.
Equal treatment of equals: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈ CN , and each pair
{i, j} ⊆ N , if ci = cj, then Si(c) = Sj(c).
Equal share lower bound: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈ CN , and each i ∈ N ,
Si(c) ≥ cin .
Independence of all but the smallest-cost: For each N ∈ N , each
c ∈ CN , each c′ ∈ CN , and each δ ≥ 0, if c′1 = c1 and for each i ∈ N\{1},
c′i = ci + δ, then S1(c
′) = S1(c).
Cost monotonicity: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈ CN , each c′ ∈ CN , and
i ∈ N , if c′i ≥ ci and for each j ∈ N\{i}, c′j = cj, then for each j ∈ N\{i},
Sj(c
′) ≤ Sj(c).8
Next is the central property to our analysis. Let N ∈ N , c ∈ CN , x ∈
X (c), and i∗ ∈ {i ∈ N | for each k ∈ N , ci ≤ ck }. The reduced problem
of c with respect to N ′ ≡ N\ {i∗} and x, rxN ′ (c), is defined by setting
for each j ∈ N ′,
(rxN ′ (c))j ≡ cj − xi∗ .
Smallest-cost consistency: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈ CN , and each
N ′ ⊂ N , if x ≡ S (c), then rxN ′ (c) ∈ CN ′ and xN ′ = S (rxN ′ (c)).
Remark: Reasonableness and smallest-cost consistency together imply effi-
ciency.
8This property is introduced by Thomson (2005). The property is a complement of
“individual cost monotonicity” (Potters and Sudho¨lter, 1999), which says the following.
Under the same hypotheses, agent i should pay at least as much as he did initially.
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3 The results
Our first result is that the SEC rule is the only rule satisfying equal treatment
of equals, independence of all but the smallest-cost, and smallest-cost consis-
tency. To prove this assertion, we use the fact that the SEC rule satisfies the
following monotonicity property: if the cost parameters of all agents increase
by the same positive amount, each agent should contribute at least as much
as he did initially.
Uniform-cost-increase monotonicity: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈ CN ,
each c′ ∈ CN , and each δ > 0, if for each i ∈ N , c′i = ci + δ, then for each
i ∈ N , Si(c) ≤ Si(c′).
Note that the SEC rule satisfies uniform-cost-increase monotonicity is an
immediate consequence of the definition of the SEC rule. Thus, the proof of
this fact is omitted. We are now ready to prove the announced assertion.
Theorem 1 The SEC rule is the only rule satisfying equal treatment of
equals, independence of all but the smallest-cost, and smallest-cost consis-
tency.
Proof. Clearly, the SEC rule satisfies equal treatment of equals, independence
of all but the smallest-cost, and smallest-cost consistency. Conversely, let S
be a rule satisfying the properties. Let N ∈ N and c ∈ CN . Let x ≡ S(c)
and y ≡ SEC(c). We show that x = y. The proof is by induction on n.
Case 1: n = 1. By efficiency of the rule, x = y.
Case 2: n > 1. The induction hypothesis is that for each N ′ ∈ N and c∗ ∈
CN ′ with N ′ ⊂ N and |N ′| ≤ n−1, we have S(c∗) = SEC(c∗). We first show
that x1 = y1. By smallest-cost consistency and the induction hypothesis, we
then conclude that x = y. So, let N ′ = N\{1}. We distinguish two cases.
Subcase 2.1: c1 = c2. Suppose, by contradiction, that x1 6= y1. Thus, ei-
ther x1 > y1 or x1 < y1. If x1 > y1, then by equal treatment of equals, x2 > y2.
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By smallest-cost consistency, x2 = S2(r
x
N ′ (c)) and y2 = SEC2(r
y
N ′ (c)). Since
x1 > y1, then for each i ∈ N ′, (rxN ′ (c))i ≤ (ryN ′ (c))i. Note that |N ′| < n. By
the induction hypothesis, S2(r
x
N ′ (c)) = SEC2(r
x
N ′ (c)). Since for each i ∈ N ′,
(ryN ′ (c))i−(rxN ′ (c))i = x1−y1 > 0, thus the two reduced problems rxN ′ (c) and
ryN ′ (c) satisfy the hypotheses of uniform-cost-increase monotonicity. Since
the SEC rule satisfies uniform-cost-increase monotonicity , it follows that
x2 ≤ y2, in violation of x2 > y2. If x1 < y1, then by a similar argument, we
derive the desired contradiction.
Subcase 2.2: c1 < c2. Let c
′ be such that c′1 = c1 and for each i ∈ N ′,
c′i ≡ ci − (c2 − c1). Let x′ ≡ S(c′) and y′ ≡ SEC(c′). Note that c′1 = c′2. By
Subcase 2.1, x′1 = y
′
1. By independence of all but the smallest-cost, x
′
1 = x1
and y′1 = y1. Thus, x1 = y1. Q .E .D .
Yeh and Hwang (2007) show that another well-known rule, the “nucleo-
lus”, is the only rule satisfying equal treat of equals, “largest-cost additivity”9,
and “largest-cost consistency”10. Their result shows that the nucleolus can
be characterized on the basis of properties that almost entirely focus on an
agent with the largest cost parameter. Thus, their result reveals the interest
of focusing an agent with largest cost parameter in characterizing the nucleo-
lus. In contrast, our Theorem 1 shows that the SEC rule can be characterized
on the basis of properties that almost entirely focus on an agent with the
smallest cost parameter. Thus, Theorem 1 reveals the interest of focusing on
an agent with the smallest cost parameter in characterizing the SEC rule.
We next present another characterization of the SEC rule on the basis of
smallest-cost consistency.
9This property says that if the cost parameter of an agent with the largest cost param-
eter increases by some positive amount, then the contribution of the agent should increase
by the same amount.
10This property is a weaker version of ν consistency (Potters and Sudho¨lter (1999)).
It is obtained by restricting attention to the departure of an agent with the largest cost
parameter.
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Theorem 2 The SEC rule is the only rule satisfying equal share lower bound,
cost monotonicity, and smallest-cost consistency.
Proof. Clearly, the SEC rule satisfies equal share lower bound, cost mono-
tonicity, and smallest-cost consistency. Conversely, let S be a rule satisfying
the three properties. Let x ≡ S(c) and y ≡ SEC(c). We show that x = y.
The proof is by induction on n.
Case 1: n = 1. By efficiency of the rule, x = y.
Case 2: n > 1. The induction hypothesis is that for each (N ′, c∗) such that
N ′ ⊂ N and |N ′| ≤ n − 1, we have S(c∗) = SEC(c∗). We first show that
x1 = y1. By smallest-cost consistency and the induction hypothesis, we then
conclude that x = y. By equal share lower bound, x1 ≥ c1n . Suppose that
x1 >
c1
n
. Let c¯ ∈ CN be such that for each i ∈ N\{1}, c¯i = c1. Let x¯ ≡ S(c¯).
By equal share lower bound and efficiency, x¯1 =
c1
n
. Now, let c¯n ∈ CN be
such that c¯nn = cn and for each i ∈ N\{n}, c¯ni = c¯i. Let x¯n ≡ S(c¯n). By
cost monotonicity, x¯n1 ≤ x¯1. Let c¯n−1 ∈ CN be such that c¯n−1n−1 = cn−1 and for
each i ∈ N\{n − 1}, c¯n−1i = c¯ni . Let x¯n−1 ≡ S(c¯n−1). By cost monotonicity,
x¯n−11 ≤ x¯n1 . Continuing this process, we have c¯2 ≡ c and x¯21 ≤ x¯31. Since
x = x¯2, we have x1 = x¯
2
1 ≤ x¯31 ≤ · · · ≤ x¯n1 = c1n , which contradicts to the
assumption of x1 >
c1
n
. Thus, x1 =
c1
n
. Q .E .D .
We now show that the properties listed in Theorems 1 and 2 are logically
independent. For that purpose, we introduce the following rules. The first
rule is the “constrained egalitarian rule” (Aadland and Kolpin, 1998).11 Start
by requiring equal contributions from all agents in N until there are γ1 ∈ R+
and k1 ∈ N such that k1γ1 = ck1 (if there are several such k1, select the
11Aadland and Kolpin (1998) name this rule as the restricted average cost-share rule.
The authors show that the contributions vector the rule chooses coincides with that pre-
scribed by the “egalitarian rule” (Dutta and Ray, 1989) applied to the associated air-
port game.
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largest). Then, each i ∈ {1, ..., k1} pays γ1. Continue by requiring equal
contributions from members of {k1 + 1, ..., n} until there are γ2 ∈ R+ and
k2 ∈ N such that k1γ1 + (k2 − k1)γ2 = ck2 (if there are several such k2,
select the largest). Then each i ∈ {k1 + 1, ..., k2} pays γ2. Continue in this
way until the total amount collected is cn. This algorithm can be expressed
as follows.
Constrained Egalitarian rule, CE: For each N ∈ N and each c ∈ CN ,
CE1(c) ≡ min
{
c1
1
, · · · , cn
n
}
CEi(c) ≡ min
{
ck−
∑i−1
p=1 CEp(c)
k−i+1 | i ≤ k ≤ n
}
2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
CEn(c) ≡ cn −
∑n−1
p=1 CEp (c) .
The second rule is a “weighted version” of the SEC rule. Given i ∈ I,
let αi ∈ R++ be agent i’s weight. Let N ≡ {1, . . . , n} and α ≡ (αi)i∈N be
the weights vector. Without loss of generality, assume that c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cn.
Then, the weighted SEC rule with respect to the weights vector α is defined
as follows: let c0 ≡ 0.
Weighted sequential equal contributions rule, SECα: For each N ∈
N , each c ∈ CN , and each i ∈ N ,
SECαi (c) ≡
αi∑n
j=1 αj
c1 +
αi∑n
j=2 αj
(c2 − c1) + · · ·+ αi∑n
j=i αj
(ci − ci−1) .
The next rule is a modified version of the SEC rule. When there are
three agents and their cost parameters differ, the rule assigns each agent an
equal share of the smallest cost parameter plus the difference between his cost
parameter and the cost parameter of his immediate predecessor; otherwise,
the rule assigns agents the contributions made by the SEC rule.
Modified sequential equal contributions rule, SEC∗: For eachN ∈ N ,
each c ∈ CN , and each i ∈ N ,
SEC∗i (c) ≡
{
Si (c) if |N | = 3 and c1 < c2 < c3;
SECi (c) otherwise,
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where S is defined as follows: Let N ≡ {1, 2, 3}.
S1(c) =
c1
3
S2(c) =
c1
3
+ c2 − c1
S3(c) =
c1
3
+ c3 − c2
The last rule assigns each agent an equal share of his cost parameter, and
then one of the agents with the largest cost parameter pays the remaining
amount to be collected. Let i∗ ∈ {i ∈ N | for each k ∈ N , ci ≥ ck }.
S∗: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈ CN , and each i ∈ N ,
S∗i (c) ≡
{
ci
n
if i ∈ N\{i∗};
ci∗ −
∑
j∈N\{i∗}
cj
n
otherwise,
Property/Rule CE SECα SEC∗ S∗ SEC
Equal treatment of equals + − + − +
Independence of all but the smallest-cost − + + + +
Smallest-cost consistency + + − − +
Equal share lower bound + − − + +
Cost monotonicity − + − + +
Table 1: Independence of the properties in Theorems 1 and 2. The
notation “+” (“−”) means that a certain rule satisfies (violates) a certain
property.
Table 1 shows that the properties listed in Theorems 1 and 2 are inde-
pendent. For instance, the CE rule satisfies equal treatment of equals and
smallest-cost consistency but violates independence of all but the smallest-
cost. The SECα rule satisfies independence of all but the smallest-cost and
11
smallest-cost consistency but violates equal treatment of equals. The SEC∗
rule satisfies equal treatment of equals and independence of all but the smallest-
cost but violates smallest-cost consistency. Thus, the properties listed in
Theorem 1 are logically independent.
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